The Kemalist camp after the court decision that temporarily reinstates Kılıçdaroğlu as leader of CHP

The Kemalist camp after the court decision that temporarily reinstatesKılıçdaroğlu as leader of CHP What is happening in the #Kemalist camp after the court decision that temporarily reinstates Kemal #Kılıçdaroğlu as leader of the #CHP (Republican People’s Party)? What are the political differences between him and #Özgür #Özel? What does this mean for #Greece? Translation by Grok

Historical-Political Context of the Crisis (Summary): The Republican People’s Party (CHP) — the party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the #Turkish Republic — has a long tradition of suppressing political opponents as well as ethnic minorities. It was not founded to function as one party among many in a pluralistic system, but rather as the dominant party managing Kemalist power within a new state governed by the principles developed by its founder (the Six Arrows). In essence, the CHP was created to act as the “state party” of a single-party political system.When the Kemalist establishment decided to align with the United States (the victor of World War II) and join the Western anti-Soviet strategy, and subsequently #NATO (a decision that was neither easy nor self-evident), it was forced to introduce a multi-party system. Under the “idealistic” U.S. foreign policy of spreading democracy (except when it doesn’t suit American interests, in which case they revert to realism), Turkey was pressured to open up its political system. The goal was also for Turkey to serve, within U.S. propaganda in the Middle East, as a “democratic” model state with an #Islamic population — an example for the difficult region. Thus, the “model state” of Turkey helped the American narrative on democracy and human rights, allowing pressure to be exerted on other Islamic countries for political concessions (in addition to military pressure).The first party founded under these American pressures was the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti), the “mother” of all subsequent opposition parties and political currents, including the Turkish Islamist political movement, whose latest representative is President Erdoğan and the AKP. In summary, within the Democrat Party, opponents of Kemal and Kemalism found political refuge and expression. Among them were Turkish Islamists, who had been represented in the First Turkish Grand National Assembly as the “Second Group.” They particularly demanded “religious freedom” and “democracy.”The end of this democratization experiment saw the Democrat Party president, Adnan Menderes, face the first military coup on 27 May 1960 (though not the last — others followed in 1971, 1980, 1997, and the failed one in 2016, which paved the way for the absolute dominance of the Turkish Islamists of the #AKP and #Erdoğan). The military junta eventually hanged Adnan Menderes on 17 September 1961 on the (infamous) island of İmralı at the age of 62.Since then, it became a Kemalist Turkish custom: whenever the Kemalist regime felt threatened — whether by left-wing or Islamist opposition — it resorted to military coups. It was common knowledge that the army was the guardian of Kemalism.However, efforts to control the political system when it escaped Kemalist control (until the balance was restored in favor of the CHP) were not limited to military juntas. Kemalist #Turkey has a long tradition of banning political parties through the Constitutional Court (or by military regimes after coups). From 1963 to the present, approximately 25–28 parties have been closed by the Court (plus many more after the 1971 and 1980 coups).Of these, about 4–5 were Islamist parties (mainly for “violating the secular character of the state” – laiklik), many more left-wing parties (dozens on grounds of “threat to territorial integrity,” “communism,” etc.), as well as pro-Kurdish ones. The last banned Islamist party was the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party – FP), part of the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) tradition of Necmettin Erbakan, which constitutes the essence of Turkish Islamism. The Virtue Party had replaced the previously banned Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). After the dissolution of the Virtue Party, a new generation of ambitious reformist Islamists founded the ruling AKP.The Crisis in the Kemalist Camp After the Temporary Court Decision:The Ankara Regional Court of Appeal ruled that the 38th Ordinary Congress of the CHP (4–5 November 2023), at which Özgür Özel was elected, suffers from absolute nullity. The main reasons cited by the court were: voting under pressure, guidance or blackmail, promises of positions, jobs or candidacies (especially from CHP-controlled municipalities) to influence the outcome, violation of the party’s statute, and Turkish legislation on party operations.With this (appealable) decision, the court reinstated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu — the leader before the contested congress — replacing the “winner” Özgür Özel.Essentially, this judicial decision appears to have split the Kemalist CHP into two camps of sworn enemies.Supporters of Kılıçdaroğlu (the 77-year-old, often called the “grandfather” of Turkish politics): Characterized as calm, restrained, with mild rhetoric and focus on social issues (e.g., equality and populism). Politically, he favors broad alliances with conservative center-right parties, such as the six-party coalition in 2023. He is trying to control the party apparatus and speaks of “cleansing” corruption.Supporters of the 51-year-old Özgür Özel: Advocate a more aggressive opposition, combative and dynamic, with a more direct, “European” and popular style. He speaks more bluntly and frequently organizes demonstrations. He led the CHP to a major victory in the 2024 local elections (retaining or winning major cities). He pushes for internal reforms (more democracy within the party, new faces, women and youth). He emphasizes street, square, and parliamentary struggle through rallies and gatherings. Characteristic phrases: “We do not surrender,” “The owners stay, the tenants leave.”In this difficult-to-reconcile rivalry, Özel retains the majority of the party’s parliamentary group (110 out of 138 MPs) and the majority of mayors (including the indicted mayor of Istanbul, İmamoğlu, and the mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş).The Two “Presidents” and Greece:Regarding their positions toward Greece, the image of the “moderate” Kılıçdaroğlu and the “aggressive” Özel is partially reversed:Kılıçdaroğlu has repeatedly accused Greece of “occupying” 18 (or more) Aegean islands and militarizing them, “violating” the Treaty of Lausanne. Between 2017 and 2023 he often said “we will take them back” and accused Erdoğan of “doing nothing.” In 2023, in a pre-election video, he raised the issue of demilitarization of the Greek Aegean islands. On the Cyprus issue, he defends the “1974 Peace Operation” and maintains a hard line. He generally addresses the more conservative electorate.Özel, although he strongly criticizes Erdoğan that his “Blue Homeland” policy is failing and that Greece is gaining ground (arming islands with European support, diplomacy, drilling), does not appear to adopt the aggressive rhetoric of “we will take them back.” He rhetorically emphasizes that in Greek-Turkish relations we must talk about “peace, not war.” He supports bilateral Greek-Turkish dialogue and has met with Greek politicians (e.g., former Prime Minister Tsipras). At the same time, he is much more pro-European (although the Islamists were also more pro-European until they consolidated power).It is clear that Mr. Özel is looking for European support, but experience in following Turkish politics clearly differentiates this stance before and after elections…Conclusion:The rupture in the Kemalist CHP — a party with a heavy authoritarian political past — appears to be leading the party toward a split and the creation of two parties.On one side, a more aggressive Kemalist party against Erdoğan, seeking to oust him from power “once and for all,” with all that this implies for Turkey based on the party’s history outlined above. It shows less aggressive rhetoric toward Greece and favors a more pro-European policy.On the other side, a party of “Kemalist wisdom” that fights corruption, traditionally nationalist and conservative. In foreign policy it outbids the ruling party’s expansionist and aggressive stance in order to compete with the AKP for the conservative vote, while being willing to make political concessions to build a broad multi-party front against the AKP and Erdoğan.On the other side of the Turkish Islamist camp, President Erdoğan and the ruling AKP have so far shown they are perfectly capable of exploiting this split to their advantage. In this light, it is not at all unlikely that early elections will be called in 2026, in the hope of yet another electoral victory, continuing the string of successes since 2002. #CHPÖzgürÖzel

Dionysis Pantis, Lawyer at the Supreme Court and Geopolitical Analyst(Dionysis Pantis is a lawyer at the Areios Pagos with twenty years of experience in litigation and advisory practice, graduate of the Democritus University of Thrace Law School, holder of a degree from the Panteion University Department of Public Administration (Public Law direction), with postgraduate studies in European & International Commercial Law and Public International Law.) | topontiki.gr https://www.topontiki.gr/2026/06/02/i-sigkrousi-sto-kemaliko-stratopedo-i-diafores-kilitsntaroglou-ke-ozel-ke-ti-simenoun-i-exelixis-gia-tin-ellada/?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1780392433