First observations on the “initial” temporary ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran:

First observations on the “initial” temporary ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran:

It confirms, in practical terms, the limits imposed by the real capacity to sustain a war in terms of military hardware and financing. Stockpiles of weapons systems and ammunition — particularly “smart”, long-range precision-strike capabilities — are limited. The use of more conventional systems and munitions, whether due to shortages or a deliberate effort to preserve resources for the future, exposes attacking forces to the risk of heavy losses, as well as to significant communication and reputational costs stemming from civilian casualties and strikes on humanitarian-sensitive targets.

The destruction of Iran’s critical infrastructure is extensive. The acceptance of Iran’s ten points for a permanent ceasefire merely means that these are recognised as issues for discussion. Naturally, alongside them, US priorities will also be placed on the table. It should be recalled that the US has submitted its own 15-point proposal. In other words, negotiations on a permanent ceasefire — or even on a broader peace arrangement or a non-aggression pact — will proceed on the basis of these two frameworks. In any case, however, this does not constitute the unconditional capitulation that Trump — along with his close aides, primarily Witkoff, the son-in-law and the crusading… Secretary of War — had sought, and which they had convinced him was achievable, contrary to assessments by the… competent intelligence services. That alone represents a major success for Iran. Already, many regard the very framing of Iran’s ten points as a major victory in itself — not only within Iran, but also within the US and across the international community — as it undermines US credibility.

Let me recall what we had previously argued — and what was fully confirmed by the six-week US/Israel–Iran war in October 2024: “Iran aspires, independently and through its own means — not via proxies — to secure the capability to contain Israel and to gain control over the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East (or West Asia), in terms of timing, geography (including within the adversary’s territory), and intensity. We observe a shift in intensity between the two operations of April 13 and October 1, as well as a… future promise of an ‘unimaginable’ next ‘response’.”The Iran-Israel conflict in the light of regional and global geopolitical (revisionist) antagonisms Pakistan, through its mediation of the temporary ceasefire agreement, is emerging from the deadlock created by the implementation of its strategic mutual-support agreement with Saudi Arabia. Under that agreement, being compelled to provide military backing for Saudi Arabia — and its… capital — by joining a war against Iran, should Riyadh have chosen that path, was something the military regime might not have been able to withstand. This was especially the case with former popular prime minister Imran Khan imprisoned, with the problems posed by the Balochistan independence movement — parts of which exist in both Pakistan and Iran — and with the extreme Islamic fundamentalism of a large segment of the Pakistani population, which would not have looked favourably on a war against Islamic Iran, a country seen as “resisting” the West and the US. Israel is outside the agreement. The agreement is solely between the US and Iran. The continuation of the Iran-Israel war is therefore entirely possible. Netanyahu has already stated that military operations in Lebanon will continue, something Iran does not accept, thereby creating problems for the ceasefire from the very first hours and causing dissatisfaction in Trump’s camp and in Washington. The “ten points” put forward by Iran are very carefully crafted and allow Tehran to speak of victory. It should be noted that they also include protection for its proxies, Hezbollah and the Houthis, claims for compensation or revenues from passage through the Straits, the lifting of all sanctions, and so on. I stress once again that these are not part of the “agreement” itself, but have merely been accepted as topics for discussion. Israel’s dissatisfaction with Trump’s “behind-closed-doors” negotiation, if it is genuine, remains to be seen in terms of how it will evolve and how it will affect US-Israeli relations — that is, “Trump-Israeli relations”. Israel’s objective of full regional dominance… remains in place; it has not been achieved to the extent desired. Does this temporary agreement for a temporary ceasefire and the launch of talks on a permanent one resolve the issue of war once and for all? No. It does not resolve the question of the Strait of Hormuz, a source of funding for Iran’s reconstruction of the enormous damage to the country’s infrastructure networks, alongside energy exports. That will become clear from Iran’s actual “behaviour” in the Strait. Nor does it leave Israel — and the… evangelicals? — “fully” satisfied. Trump’s conduct in the “negotiations” has — to put it politely — shown elements of unreliability and a tendency towards… deception, in other words the instrumentalisation of the process as a means of misleading the other side. This latter notion, or possibility, under Trumpian “norms”, should not be ruled out. From this perspective, the temporary ceasefire agreement is particularly fragile.

It will be particularly interesting to see how the “post-war” relations between the Gulf monarchies and Iran will take shape. Saudi Arabia’s leadership position among the Gulf monarchies is strengthening. What remains critical is how these states will assess the security challenges they faced during the US attack on Iran. There is clear dissatisfaction both with the US and with Iran. Of particular importance, of course, is how the monarchies — especially Saudi Arabia — will position themselves vis-à-vis the Eurasian revisionist powers, Russia and China. Turkey remained notably “quiet” during the six weeks of war, awaiting the outcome of the war of attrition and endurance between the US, Iran and Israel — and, indirectly, the Gulf monarchies — while also facing threats that it could be next on Israel’s target list after Iran. Now, however, it will seek to position itself within the evolving developments. Trump “played” his final card to the very end: that of the “massive strike”, the “terrible” ultimatum, whose deadline kept being pushed further into the future each time. Clearly, the ultimatum was yet another “bluff” by the American President, reflecting the diminished credibility of both the US and Trump himself. It is of critical importance to see how reactions within the US will unfold. The scale of these reactions could shape the strategy of Greater North America — from Panama, or Venezuela, or… who knows where — all the way to Alaska/Greenland, something that will be highly significant for the blocs of the emerging “multipolar” system.

Conclusion: Time is required for the consequences of the war — and their reflection on the negotiating power of the two sides — to become clearer during the talks on a permanent ceasefire. Iran appears, despite having suffered significant blows to its infrastructure and physical leadership, to have responded with asymmetrical retaliation that imposed substantial costs on its adversary. It did not surrender unconditionally, nor did its regime change. It remains unclear, following the assassinations of its military and political leadership, who now holds — or will ultimately hold — control in Iran. The real scale and depth of the destruction in Iran, as well as the true cost of the war and the state of US ammunition stockpiles after six weeks of intense bombardment, will become clearer in the near future — and will affect the negotiations. The new phase of negotiations carries no fewer risks than the war itself… Developments in the coming days will provide the answer to the key question: who, in the end, has been caught in the Middle Eastern trap of the six-week US–Iran war? Is President Donald Trump in the “trap” of the Ukraine and Middle East crises? P.S. 1. Iran’s ten points for a peace settlement: Commitment to non-aggression Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz Acceptance of Iran’s uranium enrichment Lifting of all primary sanctions Lifting of all secondary sanctions Termination of all UN Security Council resolutions Termination of all Board of Governors decisions Payment of compensation to Iran Withdrawal of US combat forces from the region Cessation of war on all fronts, including Lebanon Trump has stated that this plan constitutes a “workable basis” for negotiations. Dionysis Pantis is a Supreme Court lawyer and geopolitical analyst.