Is President Donald Trump in the “trap” of the Ukraine and Middle East crises?

Dionysis Pantis* Is President Donald Trump in the “trap” of the Ukraine and Middle East crises?

President Donald Trump was elected President of the United States after presenting the “Trump agenda” for American foreign policy. That agenda was recently consolidated in a coherent strategic document, published in November 2025: National Security Strategy of the United States of America. He sharply criticized the foreign policy of his predecessor, former President John Biden — whom he derisively referred to as “creepy John” — arguing that it had “foolishly” entangled the United States in unnecessary wars, diverting American diplomacy away from core U.S. interests in favor of a “blurred,” “WOKE,” global “progressive” — implicitly left-leaning — liberal, “rules-based” international order. He thus proclaimed the beginning of a “Trump era” in American foreign policy: the United States would no longer engage in “regime change” operations or “stupid” wars. In what he described as the policies of his predecessors and of the “establishment,” he identified the causes of America’s relative decline in global influence. U.S. foreign policy, he pledged, would put “America First” and restore the country to what he portrayed as its rightful pedestal of greatness (Make America Great Again). President Donald Trump promised his voters that, under his presidency, the United States would not once again become entangled in “stupid, distant wars.” He also pledged to end — through personal intervention, resolve, and political leverage — conflicts in the Middle East and in Ukraine, so that Washington could focus, without distraction, on constraining China’s rapidly expanding power. In his framing, China is the principal strategic competitor — and U.S. strategy, therefore, should concentrate on containing it. He claimed, for example, that he would resolve the war in Ukraine “within a week,” delivering the long-awaited peace. He portrayed himself as potentially the most peace-oriented U.S. president. He also expressed frustration that the Nobel Committee had not awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize, which — in his view — he “obviously” deserves. As recently as last June, President Donald Trump declared in a globally broadcast address that the United States had delivered devastating blows to Iran and its nuclear program, leading — as he asserted — to the end of the 12-day war. He appeared genuinely satisfied with the cessation of hostilities; this was evident in both tone and presentation. He sought to achieve a comparable outcome in Gaza, investing political capital and advancing policies described as unconventional — even disruptive — yet, in his assessment, effective in securing at least a relative de-escalation of violence and alleviating the humanitarian crisis (including shortages of food, water, and essential supplies). His proposals ranged from references to “Gaza real estate” and a vision of a “Riviera of the Mediterranean” to the concept of a multilateral — and notably fee-based — Gaza Council. The U.S. Secretary of State outlined the rationale behind an American strike that appeared difficult to reconcile with President Donald Trump’s earlier rhetoric — and practice. In public remarks, Mr. Rubio explained why President Trump chose to proceed against Iran at this particular juncture. According to his account, the primary objective was to limit potential American casualties. If “others” had attacked Iran, he argued, the United States would likely have been the first target of Iranian retaliation and would have sustained greater losses. By striking first, however, Washington — in his interpretation — curtailed Iran’s retaliatory capacity and provided advance warning to U.S. forces, thereby reducing overall exposure and cost. Be that as it may, for the international community, for history, and for American voters alike, one fact remains: the decision to strike Iran was ultimately taken by President Donald Trump. The launch of the U.S. — alongside Israeli — strike against Iran, although anticipated given the visible concentration of air and naval assets in the broader region, raises questions — in light of the foregoing — about the credibility of the “Trump doctrine” in American foreign policy and, consequently, about the perceived strength of the Leader, both domestically and internationally. It also entails immediate repercussions within and beyond U.S. borders. Externally: The Gulf monarchies are paying a heavy price for this U.S. policy. Their anti-Shiite orientation — and perceived “necessity” — keeps them aligned for now; yet no one can predict how, once this “Trump War” concludes, their security concerns and economic calculations will evolve, or into what policies those concerns may ultimately translate. Turkey is watching closely. It is poised to exploit any opening that may emerge in order to advance its regional and global ambitions. Ankara appears prepared either to intervene militarily to “restore” order and prevent migratory flows from a destabilized Iran — while leveraging Europe’s migration anxiety, which can translate into political backing and financial support — or to market “protection” to the Gulf monarchies, framed as abandoned by “Mother America” and “Father Trump,” offering security reassurance while seeking, to the extent possible, to substitute for the United States. At the strategic level, the creation of an Islamic, Sunni, intermediary geopolitical and geo-economic space — positioned between Eurasian powers and the West — in which Turkey would play a pivotal role as the leading industrial Muslim country, backed by the strongest military trained to NATO standards, has long been a core objective. The current moment, however, may be widening the geopolitical room for maneuver needed to pursue it. Europe feels — and in many respects is — increasingly isolated. It no longer occupies a primary position in U.S. geopolitical priorities. On the contrary, it is confronted with mounting pressure across political, economic, social, and military domains. European actors are, notably, portrayed by officials within Donald Trump’s circle as having lost their “European values” and as requiring “reform” through the rise of more right-leaning political leadership. Russia appears to be concluding that there is no room — at least in the short term — for rapprochement with either the United States or Europe. Signs are emerging of a recalibration, even a form of “boundary-setting,” by President Vladimir Putin with regard to his earlier Western-oriented overtures. The Trump strike against Iran appears to have lifted lingering reservations in Moscow: there is now limited expectation that any display of restraint or cooperation in addressing global challenges — challenges confronting the West — would translate into tangible gains in bilateral relations. Most importantly, China appears once again to be gaining time — much as it did when George W. Bush, alongside his neoconservative advisers, launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the time, Trump himself had sharply criticized those “foolish” neoconservative interventions. Bush’s strategic choices effectively anchored the United States in the Middle East and Afghanistan, granting China what many analysts describe as a “golden decade” of rapid growth, largely unimpeded by sustained U.S. containment. Today, critics argue, Trump risks offering Beijing a comparable strategic dividend: the renewed — and potentially open-ended — strategic absorption of the United States in West Asia (or the “Middle East,” from a Western vantage point). It is unlikely that he views this outcome as a deliberate concession to Washington’s principal strategic competitor. China purchases around 80% of Iran’s oil — reportedly at preferential prices — yet it is unlikely to suffer major damage from any potential constraint on imports from Iran, for three reasons: (1) given the scale of its demand, it is now a preferred customer for virtually all oil producers; (2) through carefully developed overland connectivity infrastructure with Russia, it can import energy smoothly — geopolitically “desirable” (bolstering, to one degree or another, Russia’s capacity to sustain the Ukrainian front, another “gift” this time enabled by European policies, leaving Beijing doubly satisfied, though not necessarily… grateful) — and cheaply (due to sanctions); and (3) it has expanded electricity generation from alternative sources to an impressive extent. At the same time, China is reportedly seeking to maximize U.S. costs stemming from this war by providing technology, software, weapons systems, intelligence on the disposition of American forces, and other forms of indirect support. The strategic objective would be gradual attrition in the Middle East and the erosion of U.S. military infrastructure in West Asia, so that when — and if — Washington turns more decisively to Beijing, it does so from a comparatively weakened position in Southeast Asia. Domestically, however, President Donald Trump faces his greatest stake. According to current polling, a majority of American citizens neither fully understand nor share the rationale behind this war, nor the “vital” U.S. interests said to be at stake — interests deemed sufficient to justify President Donald Trump’s decision to strike Iran and to assume the substantial risks of a conflict of high geostrategic significance, regardless of its outcome. Trump’s earlier rhetoric has also contributed to this dynamic. It helped forge a political and social majority — heterogeneous, as it may ultimately prove — under the Trump-inspired slogan MAGA (Make America Great Again). As a result, public support appears directed less toward the decision itself and more — in patriotic terms — toward the efforts of the U.S. armed forces and the young servicemen and women deployed, with hopes that the human cost will be kept as limited as possible. At the same time, suspicions persist that the President may be acting under “pressure,” weakening the narrative of a strong President and a strong America. This perception entails considerable political risk for President Trump. He is well aware of the significant opposition he faces across the political establishment — not only among Democrats but also within segments of the Republican camp. In short, many are waiting for an opening: a first serious misstep could rapidly translate into political and electoral consequences. In conclusion: With the midterm elections for the Senate and the House approaching in November, Donald Trump appears increasingly ensnared in the logic of escalation “control” — a dynamic aptly described as “the smart bomb trap.” On the one hand, the inherent limitations of aerial bombardment as a military instrument — which, on its own, cannot deliver the desired political outcomes in a conflict — apply equally to “smart” bombs. One bombs, expecting capitulation; instead, retaliation follows. Bombing intensifies; retaliation escalates. And so the cycle continues. Rather than producing the anticipated immediate submission to political will, “smart” bombs often inject nationalism into both the opposing government and its population, turning further escalation into a self-reinforcing dynamic. Thus, at the end of a war, one may find it difficult to determine — even after having “won” — whether the outcome warrants satisfaction or regret. In any event, in light of the foregoing, the U.S. strike against Iran constitutes a second geopolitical accelerator — following the first unleashed by Russia and President Vladimir Putin with the intervention in Ukraine. What unfolds during the course of this war — how and when each actor exits it — will accelerate the transition toward a world more reflective of the new balances of power that have taken shape over recent decades, with the United States itself appearing strategically distracted — in the words of President Donald Trump. To some extent, it will also contribute to shaping those very balances. Dionysis Pantis is a Supreme Court lawyer and geopolitical analyst. **The opinions published on IBNA are solely those of the authors. © IBNA 2026