Is the Mecca Agreement between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia the beginning of an Independent Intermediate Sunni Islamic Geopolitical Space between the West and Russo-China?

Is the “Mecca Agreement” the beginning of the creation of an Intermediate Islamic Geopolitical Space? Is the Mecca Agreement between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia the beginning of an Independent Intermediate Sunni Islamic Geopolitical Space between the West and Russo-China?

Dionysis Pantis*: How likely is the creation of an Intermediate Islamic Geopolitical Space? In view of the conclusion of the so-called/alleged Military (multi-)Agreement of Mecca between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (which has not been made public beyond official announcements), which did [not] fall like a bolt from the blue upon the carefree and ESSENTIALLY ABSENT Athens.Since 2021 we have been warning that the geopolitical changes (shifts in the factors of comparative power) that describe the transition from the “unipolar moment” of the system that succeeded Cold War bipolarity to the multipolar system currently taking shape create the preconditions for the formation of an intermediate Islamic geopolitical pole, between the West and Russo-China.We have also repeatedly pointed out the competition between the Gulf Kingdoms and Turkey for hegemony in the Muslim world. A competition, however, that DOES NOT PREVENT the possibilities of COOPERATION, due to the complementarity of the economies of the two poles (Turkey as an industrial country, the Gulf Kingdoms with petrodollars and investments).We have expressed this position for at least five years. Indicative and informative is the following recent publication of 8 January 2026 on ikoinonia.gr, which refers, however, to positions we formulated earlier:Dionysis Pantis*: How likely is the creation of an Intermediate Islamic Geopolitical Space? 8 January 2026 The geopolitical changes (shifts in the factors of comparative power) that describe the transition from the “unipolar moment” of the system that succeeded Cold War bipolarity to the multipolar system currently taking shape create the preconditions for the formation of an intermediate Islamic geopolitical pole, between the West and Russo-China.We have expressed this position for five years now.

In summary:The changes in the global distribution of economic power and technological dominance give countries of the former Third World – or countries that lie outside the, in the strict sense, geopolitical complex of the “West” (USA–EU–UK–Australia/Canada) – the possibility of having alternatives in their efforts toward economic development and security.Until the “unipolar moment,” states that wished to integrate into the global economic system (trade, financial services) essentially had only one choice: to hitch themselves to the Western geopolitical wagon. Any other choice, such as attachment, during the bipolar era, to the Soviet geopolitical complex, led to lagging behind, unbearable shortages of goods, sanctions and the risk of regime change, and so on.Now, however, there exists a reliable and comparatively tolerable economic–technological alternative for the development of the necessary infrastructure of a developing country and for its financing, as well as for the purchase of products competitive with Western ones, even at the level of consumption.This is due mainly to the rapid economic and technological development of China, but also to the strengthening of the Russia–China interconnection at a rapid pace after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.The United States shows itself less and less willing to intervene in regional arrangements and conflicts. At the same time, any interventions of theirs are now less effective: indicative are their hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also Turkey’s operations against the Kurds in northern Syria, essentially without the consent of the United States.Gaps and security needs are thus created that “new” ambitious regional or global players may potentially fill.Turkey’s industrial development under the Islamic government of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and President Erdoğan has upgraded the country’s ambitions. Turkey considers that its industrial base gives it the possibility of pursuing a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States and the West in general, leading it to intensely revisionist policies toward almost all its neighbours, and beyond them as well.According to this view (as an evolution of Erbakan’s religious conception), the Islamic agenda constitutes the vehicle for Turkey’s return to the club of the Great Powers and for the long-desired revision of the “unjust” treatment of the Ottoman Empire by the West.In other words, Islam (in political alliance with “Turkism”) can constitute an advantage for economic and technological progress, as well as for military–political independence. The necessary complement is financing, markets and energy.Alternative financing to that from the West can be drawn by Turkey mainly from the Gulf Kingdoms (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar), at the cost, of course, of a form of dependence, yet one that is politically necessary so that it may possess a geopolitical lever of pressure against the West.Consequently:For the first time the objective possibility is created of forming an intermediate Islamic (Sunni) geopolitical space between the main competitors, the West and Russo-China. Whether this possibility will find fertile ground to be cultivated will depend on the political will of the interested parties – either of Turkey and the kingdoms or of other actors who may create obstacles.For hegemony in this potential pole, Turkey and the Gulf Kingdoms compete.Indicative was the crisis in Turkey–Saudi Arabia relations on the occasion of the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, as well as the Qatar–Turkey relationship, with Turkey becoming involved in Qatar’s security, strengthening it during the crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and reaping corresponding economic benefits.At the same time, the financial “injections” from the UAE to Turkey, although at a high cost for Ankara, fall within this dynamic. This competition – with indicative Turkish criticisms of its “unjust” representation in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and of Arab dominance in it – is delimited, but at the same time makes approach and cooperation or complementarity of the economies of Turkey and the Gulf Kingdoms potentially feasible.Turkey is now an industrial country, with significant productive capacities, including in the field of military equipment, but with a deficit of capital, while the Kingdoms possess enormous capital for investment but a meagre industrial base.This differentiation renders their economies complementary, while the adhesive substance of Islam also operates. The juncture appears reinforcing, and especially:• the recognition by Israel of Somaliland as an independent country, despite Saudi objections to processes of partition of Islamic states and the geopolitical support for a unified Somalia;• the sharp competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Somalia and Yemen, that is, south of the Saudi kingdom, with UAE support for militias in Yemen that fight against the Saudis;• the prospect of a US and Israeli attack on Iran, combined with Tehran’s expressed intentions to cause chaos in the Persian Gulf in the event of an attack against it, targeting even Saudi oil wells. All these create security nightmares for the Saudis and conditions for possible rapprochement with other Sunni countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan.Additional, still unconfirmed, reports of trilateral military cooperation between Pakistan – the only Islamic country with nuclear weapons – Turkey and Saudi Arabia, or of an agreement for a Turkish military presence on the borders of Saudi Arabia with the United Arab Emirates, are being heard for the first time.Although reports such as the above may serve communication purposes or even function as tools of negotiating pressure, under the light of the foregoing they acquire ever greater weight and become ever more probable scenarios. CONCLUSION: An approach with such characteristics would constitute a very significant development in the already extremely sensitive geopolitical regional complex of the Middle East (SE Asia), as it would disrupt – or, otherwise, redefine – once again the balances among the four regional powers: Iran, the Gulf Kingdoms, Turkey and Israel, after the historic developments in Syria and the Israeli–Iranian conflict. ALSO, ALREADY IN AN INTERVIEW of ours ON CHANNEL 1 OF PIRAEUS IN 2021 WITH THE JOURNALIST Vasilis Talamangas, which was republished by the website olympia.gr, WE STATED:Turkish Islamic economy and banking, Islamic elite, Arab–Turkish competition in the emerging Islamic geopolitical space

kalinda 7 December 2021 Add olympia.gr as a preferred source on Google Interview with Vasilis Talamangas on Channel 1 of Piraeus on the Turkish crisis, the Turkish Islamic economy and banking, the (Turkish) Islamic elite, the Arab–Turkish competition in the emerging Islamic geopolitical–geoeconomic space between China and the West. Dionysis Pantis DP: Good week Mr Talamangas, good week also to your listeners Vasilis Talamangas: VT We were talking earlier with Mr Lampropoulos as well. [From Dionysis Pantis from pantislawoffice.blogspot.com]VT (continuation): Look, I read an article of yours and I think you have hit the mark. So it says Erdoğan’s new economic theory is contrary to everything we knew about economics until today. Erdoğan says that high interest rates lead to price increases and reducing them strengthens production and exports – the opposite. It seems that this is an Erdoğan Islamic banking. Isn’t that so? DP: You put it excellently, it is exactly that. Let us say that Islamic banking, its main characteristic is this aversion – which comes from the Quran, from the Holy Book – to interest. VT: Yes. DP: So this issue is very important for Islamists. It will also show the success of the Islamic programme and of the Islamic experiment in Turkey; that is why it has very great value for Erdoğan. Because we should not forget that this is a government of approximately 20 years. VT: Yes DP: Right? So [he wants it to appear that] the Islamic agenda that we have mentioned many times has brought results. That is, the Turkish economy has evolved into an economy that respects the basic Islamic principles. This is the reason that these parties, the Islamic parties, reached the point, after this historical path that we have referred to many times and which was a very hard path, with coups, with bans on candidacies, with bans on parties by the Constitutional Court, to reach this point. So, therefore, in view of the 2023 elections, President Erdoğan wants to show that the Islamic economic programme has also advanced. VT: Indeed. Now what reading do you make, Dionysis Pantis, of the political developments, because in recent days with the way various religious–political groups are moving – I am accustomed to going to the religious ones such as the Alevis who are the largest religious minority in Turkey with 18–20 million, a very powerful intellectual group of citizens and lately it seems they are moving much more not at the level of demonstrations but at the level of exchange of views, where they can and as they can, something which may also be a generative cause of future developments, because when you see 18 million, the country’s intellectuals moving, you understand that at some point you will face something ahead, isn’t that so? DP: Look. We must not forget that this is not a government: it is a regime. In 20 years a regime has been created. That is, the previous Kemalist regime was replaced by the Islamic regime. Here we are talking about the officials who serve this regime being many thousands and many of a very high level. Do not forget that when speaking of Islamists we should not bring to mind images of a, let’s say, decadent figure, a figure that has no contact with science and especially with technology. We should say that it has no relation to what we consider. There is specialisation. There is an elite, I want to say, that has been created through the Islamic orders (Naqshbandi etc.). It is not that the space of the intelligentsia is only on one side, but the Islamic intelligentsia also has very significant representatives. Simply remember that when the Arabs translated Plato and Aristotle and the ancient Greeks they mainly translated technical books and not humanistic ones, not those that referred to democracy but medicine etc. The same applies analogously to Islamism in Turkey at this moment. They have this tendency. And let us not forget that from the nine university institutions that [Erdoğan/AKP] found in 2002 it now has approximately 200 which, however, have mainly a technological orientation and are integrated into the Islamic strategic plan of creating an Islamic productive and consumer base. We said that it has as an immediate goal the Pan-Turanic union, a commercial union, but also the Pan-Islamic one, so there it will have to replace Western consumer goods with Islamic goods. There also lies the competition between Arab national Islamism and Turkish national Islamism for hegemony in the Islamic space. The Islamic space, Mr Talamangas, tends to be an autonomous variable of the international system that will gradually make its position felt, moving between China and the Western world. That is where Erdoğan wants to lead. VT: Indeed. https://www.mixcloud.com/KanaliEna904/%CE%BF-%CE%B4%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%BD%CF%8D%CF%83%CE%B7%CF%82-%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AE%CF%82-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AC%CE%BB%CE%B9-%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%B1-904-6122021/

ALSO: In the television programme of the publisher of the eponymous publications Mr Arnaoutis on 16 October 2023 we discussed our position with the main points: 1st In our intensely globally geopolitically revisionist era the precondition is created for the formation of an autonomous intermediate geopolitical space between the West & the coalition around Russia & China. Now there exist the possibilities for Muslim states to develop & secure their defence/security without the necessary one-dimensional dependence on the West. Turkey has developed an independent industrial base (for this reason it has needs for energy – markets – capital), among which also a military industry, which gives it capabilities that are multiplied by the clear revisionist will of its Turko-Islamic elite. The Gulf Kingdoms with their enormous financial/investment capacities can exercise a significantly more autonomous policy. Turkey & the Gulf Kingdoms move competitively in the intermediate Islamic geopolitical space, while their economies function complementarily (industry/investment capital). & other Muslim countries are on the path of economic development seeking their place in the market of approximately one billion Muslims worldwide. The possibilities created by their intermediate position in nearly equivalent blocs are very great. It is no longer a one-way street to seek toward the West for transfer of technology, know-how, investments, military material/security & the other pole can secure for them equivalent technological/economic means. Islam had an intense political dimension from its foundation; it was not simply a religious system but also a state entity, the first Arab Caliphate. Islam determined the Turkish political system during the 100 years of life of the Turkish State, especially the last ones under the AKP Justice & Development Party & President Erdoğan. Islam also in the Middle East plays a decisive political role through the concept of Holy War (#Jihad) & Islamic Eschatology, as described in the Quran & in the Traditions – Hadith, which influence leaderships & peoples. In Turkey Islamism was one of the 4 currents of thought of the Ottoman Elite with the aim of restoring Ottoman decline & restoring Ottoman dominance. The other three were Ottomanism, Turkism (Turkish world), modernisation (almost wholesale introduction of Western institutions e.g. economy, human rights etc.). It appeared as an ideological current from the establishment of the Turkish State. In the First Great Turkish National Assembly it presented itself in an uncoordinated way with Islamist intellectuals who became known as the 2nd Group (1st was Kemal). After they were persecuted, especially the Sufi orders which were forced to close or to emigrate to the Balkans, especially Albania, they began to regain political power with the introduction of the multi-party system imposed by the USA & the Menderes Government. The West with its arrogance wished to impose Western institutions with catastrophic results both for itself and for the Muslim states that were tested. The same happened with the Arab Spring but also with the advice of the Gulf Kingdoms on how Muslim fundamentalism should be confronted. Advice that the West largely ignored, especially in an earlier first phase, playing with fire & extreme Islamism in Afghanistan, Syria etc. with the known results. 2) Jihad is the expansion of Islam by every means even but not only with warlike violence until the whole planet is integrated into the Islamic House, that is, Islamic leaderships & majorities predominate everywhere. #Jihad however is according to the Islamic Tradition (Hadith) also and especially the obligation of the believer to oppose power that distances itself from the commands of the Quran & of the Prophet. That is, what Islamists everywhere did in the states that were either governed by Baathist nationalist parties or socialist nationalist ones in the Arab countries or in the Kemalist regime that imposed a secular (non-Islamic) state abolishing the Caliphate which had in practice been abolished due to the loss of the Holy Cities of Mecca & Medina. In other words the Turkish Islamists have been in Jihad from the foundation, perhaps even before, of the Turkish State. Turkey wants to throw off from itself the image of the long arm of the West / NATO / Israel in the Islamic world, so that it can hegemonise, as it aspires in the #islamicworld. Its orientation is structurally anti-Western & only tactically, in order to achieve short-term goals that it considers important & until it achieves them (e.g. F-35) does it make tactical openings. 3) Eschatology – Gog Magog Armageddon The whole discussion here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI7JlvxKivE&t=1209s

ALSO: The 2nd part of the interview of Dionysis Pantis on “Greeks Everywhere” by the distinguished and experienced journalist Thanasis Choupis, on the ERT radio station “Voice of Greece,” which is addressed to our expatriates and philhellenes abroad around the world. TOPICS OF THE 2ND PART OF THE INTERVIEW: The deep roots of Turkish Islamism in Turkish society that explain (together with the “tricks”) its political hegemony and its electoral victories for 22 years now. The intermediate (between the #USA and #China) Islamic geopolitical space & the competition for its hegemony between Islamic Turkey and the Gulf Kingdoms, the delimitation of this competition by the complementarity of the economies of the competitors (Turkey as an industrial state with a labor force, the Gulf Kingdoms with investment capital and the ambition for the development of high technology). Greek strategy for the country to navigate safely through the coming decades of cataclysmic geopolitical rearrangements on the planet and the escalation of global geopolitical competition.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tb00gMdohk8&t=12s and still a multitude of articles and television and radio programmes on the subject can be found by the interested party either on our blog: https://pantislawoffice.blogspot.com/ or on our YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@%CE%94%CE%B9%CE%BF%CE%BD%CF%8D%CF%83%CE%B7%CF%82%CE%A0%CE%B1%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AE%CF%82-%CE%B85%CE%B6