Full confirmation of the position we articulated in our 2024 analysis concerning the loss of escalation dominance by the United States and Israel in the Middle East, and Turkey’s readiness to fill the resulting power vacuum (see already the “Mecca Agreement,” facilitated with a green light from Trump).

Full confirmation of the position we articulated in our 2024 analysis concerning the loss of escalation dominance by the United States and Israel in the Middle East, and Turkey’s readiness to fill the resulting power vacuum (see already the “Mecca Agreement,” facilitated with a green light from Trump).

As early as 7 October 2024, in an article published by the authoritative International Balkan News Agency (IBNA), we observed that Israel—acting in concert with the United States—had, for the first time, lost escalation dominance. This shift constitutes a decisive change in the balance of power in the Middle East. Until that point, Israel had compelled its adversaries to comply precisely because it possessed this dominance: the ability to respond disproportionately (“You strike once, I strike a hundred times”) in a classic “tit-for-tat” dynamic that opponents could not match. In our IBNA article entitled “The Iran–Israel Conflict in the Light of Regional and Global Geopolitical (Revisionist) Rivalries”—published simultaneously in English, Bulgarian and Turkish—we noted the following: “Iran’s first direct attack on Israel on 13 April 2024 marked a significant transformation in the Middle East. For the first time, Israel confronted a state adversary capable of imposing retaliation on Israeli territory itself, thereby challenging Israel’s previously near-absolute regional military superiority. Until that moment, Israel could act largely as it wished without facing substantial consequences or credible deterrent countermeasures. It also retained the capacity to escalate military operations—what international relations literature terms ‘escalation dominance’—without encountering a peer competitor. This dominance is now under challenge. Israel faces the risk that its ability to escalate will be constrained: the credible threat of retaliation, carrying calculable and potentially high costs, may deter it from actions that an adversary regards as red lines and that would trigger a painful response. Iran, for its part, seeks independently—not merely through proxies—to delimit Israel’s freedom of action and to gain control over the escalation of conflict in the Middle East (or ... West Asia). This ambition encompasses the timing, geographic scope (including strikes on adversary territory) and intensity of confrontation. The difference in intensity between the operations of 13 April and 1 October, together with the explicit promise of an even more severe future response, illustrates this trajectory. Previously, Iran had built or reinforced a network of actors—Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite militias (designated terrorist organizations by the West and Israel), the Assad regime in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen—creating a broad constellation of forces hostile to Israel and Western interests. Despite its complexity and reach, this network primarily harassed Israel with comparatively limited technological means while keeping direct warfare away from Iranian territory.

In this way, Iran kept Israel and the United States occupied with its proxies, thereby preserving a relative peace for itself. Despite sanctions, aggressive Western rhetoric, designation as part of an ‘axis of evil,’ economic isolation, the attrition of the Iran–Iraq War, and strained relations with the Gulf monarchies, Iran succeeded in remaining essentially unscathed throughout the critical decades of the 1990s and 2000–2020. During the so-called ‘unipolar moment’—when the United States stood as the sole superpower—Iran skillfully avoided a fate comparable to that of Iraq under the U.S.-led coalition. Although other factors, including the high costs of intervention and domestic questioning of whether the Gulf wars served core American interests, contributed to U.S. restraint, Iran’s approach exemplifies the classical principle of self-help and deterrence. By a notable geopolitical irony, the primary burden of containing Iran was borne not by Iran itself but by its chief regional rival, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—an outcome that served broader U.S. strategic objectives while sparing Iran the direct costs of confrontation. This was not mere chance but the product of a deliberate strategy of deception, attrition of third parties, and the use of proxies to keep declared adversaries focused on more immediate threats. The existence of this strategy itself functioned as a significant deterrent. Iran has now demonstrated the results of decades of systematic investment in drones and missiles, undertaken while its opponents were preoccupied elsewhere. In the first operation, systems travelled for approximately two hours; in the second (‘True Promise’), 181 hypersonic ballistic missiles reached their targets in roughly twelve minutes. A sufficient number penetrated Israel’s advanced air-defence network—widely regarded as among the world’s most capable—even when reinforced by American, British, Jordanian and other allied systems. These two operations, deliberately named True Promise 1 and 2 by Iran, signal a structural change in the regional security environment. The ongoing contest of power, escalation, retaliation, information warfare and strikes that affect civilian populations and morale continues. Regional and external actors alike are watching closely to determine how the confrontation will conclude—and how any resulting power vacuum may be exploited.” These observations have been fully borne out by subsequent events. Specifically, the sustained strategic bombing campaign conducted by the United States and Israel against Iran over a forty-day period—during which the United States alone struck approximately 13,000 targets—failed to achieve the desired outcomes of unconditional Iranian submission, regime change, or the elimination of Iran’s retaliatory capacity.

As a result, the United States was compelled to acquiesce in a greater Turkish role: first in Syria, then through the Mecca Agreement in the ‘protection’ of the Persian Gulf monarchies, and subsequently—via Jolani—in Lebanon. This development aligns precisely with our earlier assessment that Turkey was independently monitoring and preparing to capitalize on the emerging power vacuum. In retrospect, both of our central predictions have been confirmed by recent developments.

The full original article, available in English, Bulgarian and Turkish, may be accessed here👇: https://www.ibnaeu.com/2024/10/07/i-sygkrousi-iran-irak-ypo-to-prisma-ton-perifereiakon-kai-pagkosmion-geopolitikon-anatheoritikon-antagonismon/