How likely is the creation of an intermediate Islamic geopolitical space?

The geopolitical changes (shifts in factors of comparative power) describing the transition from the “unipolar moment” of the system that followed Cold War bipolarity to an emerging multipolar order are creating the conditions for the formation of an intermediate Islamic geopolitical pole between the West and the Russo-Chinese axis. We have articulated this position for the past three years. In summary: 1. Changes in the global distribution of economic power and technological dominance are enabling countries of the former Third World –or those lying, in a narrow sense, outside the geopolitical complex of the “West” (United States–European Union–United Kingdom–Australia/Canada)– to pursue alternative paths toward economic development and security. Until the “unipolar moment,” states seeking integration into the global economic system (trade, financial services) effectively had only one option: to bind themselves to the Western geopolitical framework. Any other choice, such as alignment with the Soviet geopolitical bloc during the bipolar era, led to economic underperformance, severe shortages of goods, sanctions and the risk of regime change. Today, however, a credible and comparatively tolerable economic and technological alternative exists for developing and financing the necessary infrastructure of an emerging economy, as well as for accessing products competitive with Western ones, even at the level of consumer markets. This shift is driven primarily by China’s rapid economic and technological growth, alongside the accelerated strengthening of Russia–China connectivity following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 2. The United States appear increasingly reluctant to intervene in regional settlements and conflicts. At the same time, when interventions do occur, they tend to be less effective: indicative examples include the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well as Turkey’s operations against the Kurds in northern Syria, carried out largely without U.S. consent. As a result, security gaps and needs are emerging that may be filled by “new,” ambitious regional or global actors. 3. Turkey’s industrial development, under the Islamist government of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and President Erdoğan, has elevated the country’s ambitions. Ankara argues that its industrial base enables a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States and the West more broadly, pushing it toward strongly revisionist policies against almost all of its neighbours, and beyond. In this view—an evolution of Erbakan’s religious doctrine—the Islamist agenda serves as the vehicle for Turkey’s return to the club of Great Powers and for the sought-after revision of the West’s “unfair” treatment of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, Islam (in political alliance with “Turkism”) can serve as an advantage for economic and technological progress, as well as for military and political autonomy. The necessary complement is financing and energy. Alternative funding outside the West can be drawn primarily from the Gulf monarchies (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar), at the cost, of course, of a form of dependence—one deemed politically necessary in order to maintain geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis the West. Consequently, for the first time, an objective possibility emerges for the formation of an intermediate Islamic (Sunni) geopolitical space between the main competitors, the West and the Russo-Chinese axis. Whether this possibility will find fertile ground to develop will depend on the political will of the actors involved—either Turkey and the Gulf monarchies or other players that may seek to obstruct it. Turkey and the Gulf states are competing for hegemony within this potential pole. Indicative was the crisis in Turkey–Saudi Arabia relations following the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, as well as the Qatar–Turkey relationship, with Ankara becoming involved in Qatar’s security during the crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and reaping corresponding economic benefits. At the same time, financial “infusions” from the United Arab Emirates to Turkey, albeit at a high cost for Ankara, form part of this dynamic. This competition—illustrated by Turkish criticism over its “unfair” representation within the Islamic Organization and Arab dominance within it—is being delineated, while at the same time making rapprochement or even economic complementarity between Turkey and the Gulf monarchies potentially feasible. Turkey has by now become an industrial country with significant productive capabilities, including in the field of military equipment, but with a shortage of capital, whereas the Gulf states possess vast capital available for investment but a weak industrial base. This differentiation renders their economies complementary, reinforced by the binding element of Islam. The current context appears reinforcing, particularly through Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, despite Saudi objections to processes of partitioning Islamic states and its geopolitical support for a unified Somalia; the intense competition between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in Somalia and Yemen—namely south of the Saudi kingdom—with UAE support, in arms and funding, for Yemeni militias fighting Saudi-backed forces; and the prospect of a United States and Israeli attack on Iran, combined with Tehran’s expressed intentions to trigger chaos in the Persian Gulf in the event of an attack against it, including by targeting Saudi oil facilities. All of this generates acute security anxieties for Saudi Arabia and creates conditions for a potential rapprochement with other Sunni countries, such as Turkey and Pakistan. Additional, still unverified, reports are emerging for the first time regarding trilateral military cooperation between Pakistan—the only Islamic country with nuclear weapons—Turkey and Saudi Arabia, or an agreement on a Turkish military presence along Saudi Arabia’s border with the United Arab Emirates. Although reports such as those mentioned above may serve communication purposes or even function as tools of negotiating pressure, in light of the foregoing they are gaining increasing weight and becoming increasingly plausible scenarios. An approach with such characteristics would constitute a highly significant development within the already extremely sensitive geopolitical regional complex of the Middle East (Southwest Asia), as it would disrupt—or alternatively redefine—once again the balance among the four regional powers: Iran, the Gulf monarchies, Turkey and Israel, following the now historic developments in Syria and the Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Dionysis Pantis, Public and International Law Lawyer – Geopolitical Analyst