The Subtle Strategy of Saudi Arabia — and, More Broadly, the Gulf Kingdoms — in the Middle East

ionysis Pantis* During the era of bipolarity (USA–USSR) and the subsequent “unipolar moment” experienced by the planet — when the United States stood as the sole superpower — the Gulf Kingdoms were unable to directly counterbalance the geopolitical pressure exerted on them by the Palestinian Question, Israel’s strategy of regional hegemony, and the U.S. military presence in the area, exercised primarily through naval and air power projection.

The economic power generated by petrodollars was not sufficient to counter the Western strategy of keeping the Gulf Kingdoms — and Saudi Arabia in particular — consistently one technological generation behind the weapons systems supplied to Israel. Nevertheless, the enduring and decisive “memory” of the former Arab Empire’s dominance, the power of petrodollars, and Islamic conservatism (Wahhabism) contributed to the Arab refusal — led unequivocally by Saudi Arabia — to accept Western cultural imperialism, turning instead toward their national and religious identity, often with extreme strictness. At the same time, the Gulf Kingdoms managed to create and sustain a more or less “underground” propaganda substrate/infrastructure that eroded the Western narrative, while their visible posture was one of apparent “submission” to the West. This subtle activity gradually undermined the moral foundations of the West’s justificatory narrative for its imperial policies. At the same time, the Gulf Kingdoms effectively reject the end-state sought by the United States and Israel in the Middle East, calling for revisions to the neoconservative “New Middle East” strategy in the U.S., as well as to the approach of “cleansing” the Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank through their “transfer” elsewhere. This subtle and quiet strategy is producing results: it exposes those attempting to reshape the Middle East to a long-term erosion of the moral and institutional legitimacy of their “new Middle East” project. The refusal to accept a “final solution” in Gaza and the wider region leads them to adopt increasingly extreme policies of repulsive violence, which deepen the vicious cycle and further activate the process of destabilising “revelation.” At the same time — and methodically — by simply projecting the realistic image and “objective” news as they are, either through their own media or via indirect influence, the Gulf Kingdoms manage to “reveal” the bias and “hypocrisy” of the West (their ally and… protector), without being forced into rhetorical outbursts that would cost them in their relations with the United States and the EU. Moderation in rhetoric and (strategic?) patience pave the way for accepting a strategy of massive capital investments in the United States and, secondarily, in the European Union, thereby increasing the influence of the Gulf Kingdoms on American policy and in Europe. Characteristic is the journey of the Saudi Crown Prince and his delegation — a team with high-level Western education, excellent English, top-tier university training, and advanced investment experience and expertise. He offers enormous capital, reaching the almost mythical figure of one trillion dollars, directed toward vital high-technology sectors such as Artificial Intelligence, superconducting magnets, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and more. These necessary investments and funds, essential for maintaining the U.S. lead in high technology, are advanced and carried out without any concessions in the cultural domain: traditional attire (the Crown Prince emphasised the importance and the wager of preserving cultural identity by noting that many expected to see him in a Western suit — but that never happened), confidence stemming from a clear reading of the contemporary geopolitical landscape, adherence to Islamic tradition, customs and social norms, the traditional social and family structures of the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab tribes, and a firm awareness of the significance of their capital for investment programmes in the US and the EU — all while extracting, in a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust, technology and political support for the Kingdom. Political support from President Trump is clear and unequivocal on all the difficult issues that arose in the recent past and posed a real and immediate danger to the Kingdom. All of the above naturally contributes to the growing influence of the Gulf Kingdoms — and particularly Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud — in the United States and, consequently, in U.S. policy toward the Middle East, in a win–win framework. After all, political support from the United States can prove decisive for Saudi Arabia’s major geo-economic and geo-strategic ventures, which will largely determine the Kingdom’s economic and political future. Such is the scale of the Kingdom’s resource wealth, both current and future, that, for example, a favourable U.S. stance on the valuation of the ARAMCO “offering” and on its negotiation/listing at the desired price on the capital markets (the Riyadh stock exchange) could potentially cover the entirety of the invested capital. Merely by increasing ARAMCO’s market value from roughly USD 2 trillion to USD 3 trillion — with the favourable disposition of international investment houses — the Kingdom’s coffers could be filled with an additional vast volume of liquidity. Western arrogance and sense of superiority has become so blinding that this subtle strategy goes unnoticed — even today, when, as noted earlier, the distribution of global power factors is shifting to the detriment of the West, and Arab media outlets and influence networks enjoy worldwide reach, actively shaping international public opinion. The Gulf Kingdoms — and Saudi Arabia in particular — exercise control over the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which they founded to serve precisely this subtle strategic purpose. Saudi Arabia also controls the holy sites of the Muslim world, Medina and Mecca, giving it an objectively immense comparative advantage within the Islamic world as well as within the broader regional system of the Middle East, alongside Turkey, Iran and Israel. At the economic level, the Gulf Kingdoms — again with Saudi Arabia at the forefront — control OPEC. Through OPEC, they exert decisive influence over international oil prices, applying pressure via pricing on Russia, Venezuela and Iran — a practice that simultaneously serves Western demands for affordable energy and the necessary stability of prices at a satisfactory level that ensures steady profitability, investment and modernization in the extraction industry, all of which are crucial issues for oil-producing states. Strategic investments — including stakes in cutting-edge technology companies — make them indispensable geo-economic actors, while simultaneously ensuring the necessary diversification of their portfolios so as to reduce the dependence and exposure of their economies to energy-price crises. The Gulf Kingdoms are both the holders and the users — indeed, the essential investors — of the coveted petrodollars. With the political leverage the Gulf Kingdoms gain through these strategic moves, they act in a characteristically conservative yet reliable manner: they measure, calculate, take carefully managed distance when necessary, and forge partnerships with powers that, until recently, were considered all but “forbidden.” Their major clients, moreover, are no longer found only in the West, but increasingly in East Asia and the Pacific, with whom they trade the coveted oil directly. Within the framework of the new global system promoted by the Eurasian bloc, the Gulf Kingdoms — and Saudi Arabia in particular — understand the importance of the Arabian Peninsula and Arab oil for China and the emerging global economy. A relative stabilisation of the region is likely to significantly upgrade the geopolitical importance of the Arabian Peninsula and of Saudi Arabia, the leading state among the Gulf Kingdoms, as the area that — by necessity of geography — constitutes the essential link and corridor connecting East Asia with the African continent. This offers enormous opportunities for enhancing Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical role, as well as the global standing and radiance of the Saudi Royal House within the Islamic world and beyond. Thus, they are no longer as willing to tolerate Western destabilising actions in the region. At the same time, however, they secure the necessary political support relationship with the United States. Amid this tectonic shift in the Middle East and the wider international system, the United States and the West had placed almost all their strategic expectations on the success of Russia’s attrition, capitulation, or even dissolution, along with a change in its political leadership. The remarks by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — former Latvian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas — regarding the desirability of partitioning Russia into numerous smaller states are indicative of this strategic mindset, not only within Europe but also within the previous U.S. Administration, with which the European elite was in full strategic alignment. Within this framework, economic and political control over Russia would have granted the West/the United States an absolute advantage over their primary competitor, China, without disrupting the profitability of Western multinationals and the billionaires operating there. Beyond the fact that the success of this core strategy would place Russia’s natural resources under Western control — in one form or another — it would simultaneously deprive China of an alternative supply source for its industrial base, limiting its autonomy and, potentially, forcing it to accept the “international, law-based order” of the Liberal International Order (LIO), or what is otherwise termed the Rules-Based International Order (RBIO), which constituted the backbone of the shared strategy of Europe and the pre-Trump United States — in other words, of the West. Thereafter, all remaining issues would be “appropriately” settled. Had the above plan succeeded, the room for manoeuvre available to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Kingdoms would once again have been extremely narrow — indeed, even narrower: virtually non-existent. In a multipolar world, however, their geopolitical and geo-economic importance and autonomy are strengthened, positioning them as a potential intermediary geopolitical pole with distinct religious (Islam) and national (Arabism) identity characteristics. With the fronts open in Ukraine and Gaza, the United States cannot focus as much as President Trump and his team would like on deterring their principal competitor: a predictably revisionist China. Their involvement at this level — as in the Gaza crisis and the Israel–Iran tug-of-war in the Middle East/West Asia — has become an obstacle to U.S. global strategy. It is also now untimely. The era in which a more decisive U.S. posture toward Iran could — if successful — send a clear message of unipolar dominance in the post-bipolar international system has probably passed. The strain on the dispersed U.S. military forces in the region, combined with the Navy’s reduced ability to operate effectively in the Persian Gulf (or nearby, off the Iranian coastline in the Indian Ocean) due to widespread proliferation of missile technology, limits American capabilities and increases their dependence on Israel and the Gulf Kingdoms for exercising influence in the region. At the same time, a further escalation of U.S. entanglement in Ukraine and Gaza could offer China an opportunity to “move” — either in the South China Sea theatre or against Taiwan. In such a scenario, the United States would find itself simultaneously involved, one way or another, in three theatres of high geopolitical tension (if not outright conflict), all “on fire”: 1. Ukraine, 2. the Middle East, and 3. the (Northwest) Pacific/Southeast Asia. This would expose Washington to the great destroyer of empires: overextension. On the other hand, the clear risk for Israel and Ukraine — that the United States may eventually be forced to prioritise countering China in the Pacific rather than sustaining its support for them — is pushing both countries toward a strategy of escalation aimed at definitively locking the United States into their strategic objectives. The crisis in the Middle East will persist, increasing the level of risk even for the most basic fundamentals of the states in the region. The arrogance born of past unchecked action — before the emergence of the new regional and global realities — may lead to imprudent escalatory moves that fail to take these new geopolitical conditions into account. In such a case, the risks will indeed be great for all states in the region — but so will the opportunities — and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Kingdoms will need to employ every ounce of the influence they have been methodically building. *Dionysis Pantis, Lawyer, geopolitical analyst © IBNA 2025