Is Europe the "victim" of US policy in Ukraine?

Is Europe the "victim" of US policy in Ukraine?

Newsroom NEWSROOM 13 JUNE 2024 142 ΠΡΟΒΟΛΈΣ READING IN 1 MINUTE Είναι η Ευρώπη το «θύμα» της πολιτικής των ΗΠΑ στην Ουκρανία; Dionysis Pantis* This article was published in the Independent Balkan News Agency (IBNA) the independent news agency focusing on the wider region of Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean at the following link:https://www.ibnaeu.com/en/2024/06/13/einai-i-evropi-to-thyma-tis-politikis-ton-ipa-stin-oukrania/ The dominant view in the political debate is that European countries are being dragged and carried by the US and that this is the result of the asymmetrical diffusion of power between them (with the US being the strong pole in bilateral relations imposing forced compliance on weak Europe). It is also widely argued that the lack of a coherent European Foreign Policy and the lack of an EU defence arm, and not the intra-European national/nationalist rivalries, is due to the US strategy towards Europe. Further, that in the end, Europe and the European states passively suffer the forced synchronisation of their foreign policy with the choices of the US. In the case of the Ukrainian issue, a natural consequence of the above theory is that Europe and the European countries followed the US policy, from the beginning of the "orange revolution", of "undermining" the Minsk agreements with the massive arming of Ukraine and military aid and training, with the result that they became trapped in the present conflict and suffered the most significant adverse consequences, especially by being cut off from the direct supply of cheap energy from Russia. A fact that slows down their economies and reduces the competitiveness of their industries, while the US gains by selling them expensive shale gas. But is it so? The escalation in Ukraine, in Europe, was certainly a particularly important challenge for European security. Certainly greater than the US attack and invasion of Iraq, for particularly obvious reasons. In the case of Iraq, however, Europe and most European countries (especially France - Germany) questioned and did not join the American strategy, did not join the coalition of the willing except for the always willing Great Britain and the Netherlands. The case of France and its Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who refused European and French support, is typical. But the European attitude towards Iran has also shown strong signs of diversification especially after the US withdrawal (by decision of President Trump) from the Iran nuclear deal. The US with its failures in Afghanistan, where it withdrew leaving many of its partners at the mercy of the Taliban and almost all of its equipment there as a "gift" to the Islamist extremists, in Syria, where its most loyal allies were left exposed both in Syria in three Turkish incursions, and inside Turkey the pro-American Democratic Party, with its leader still in prison, and elsewhere, it is now clear that they cannot be considered the long-term ally that ensures European security without the need for autonomous European defence capability. Trump's presidency has, in the bluntest way, set the limits of the entrenched notion that the US will guarantee European security in perpetuity. Too declaratively then and certain, European countries and especially Germany, refused expressis verbis Trump's demands, namely, increasing their military spending to more than 2% of their GDP, decoupling from Russian gas and replacing it with the more expensive American shale: on the basis of Europe's "energy security" and ... certain, as protection now in the new "business" view is no longer "free". President Trump wondered ... loudly why would the US pay for and care about problems in Syria or North Africa or Middle East areas so far from the isolated and remote shores of the US and so close to old but rich Europe? Then Europe opposed Trump's US (especially Germany) to these demands which today, in the midst of the Ukrainian adventure, have all been de facto and completely met. So it is clear that Europe and European countries: a) had all the ... evidence they needed (and the ... analytical ability) that it would be good to rely on their own forces rather than exclusively on the US, b) where they chose politically very well (and absolutely hard) they confronted the US on issues that were very minor for them. So why, if they wanted it politically, did they not strongly oppose US policy and Ukraine? And even after Brexit, where the UK had every reason in its strategy to weaken Europe, to implement its policy of disconnecting it from Russia, creating an impenetrable middle European wall, including Poland in the North, passing through Ukraine in the middle and continuing towards Romania and Bulgaria. Long before they rose to the international stage as a World Power, the then young USA, the European powers of England, France, Austria-Hungary, all agreed that their basic strategy was to isolate Russia, which is why they stubbornly denied it control of the Istanbul Straits (Dardanelles) and, if possible, control of the Black Sea. And that was before Russia's vast wealth resources (except for grain) were revealed. And Napoleon, as he confided in the calm and ... isolation of Saint Helena (after the famous Waterloo, his arrest and exile in 1816) to his follower Count Las Cases, France's greatest adversary, even more than naval England (which could attack it at any time), was Russia, which, according to the great politician and strategist, was the greatest danger for the hole West as well. Russia, with its vast expanses (to which when in danger it could retreat and whenever prepared to ... return) and its Euro-Asian vast human reserves, was Europe's greatest problem (hence the importance of intermediate Poland). But also afterwards, when the energy wealth of Russia had become known, which of course, along with the vast agricultural "idylls" for the dominant "Aryans" (sic and sick), were coveted by Hitler and Nazi Germany, Hitler chose the hard road to "subordinate" Slavic Russia (to secure energy and vital space for Aryan domination) rather than continuing, after Romania, to the oil fields of the racially sisterly controlled Mosul (via friendly Turkey) by Britain, as German strategists had suggested. Consequently, the prospect of the crushing of Russia, through both Ukraine and the Baltic and south of Georgia, and the consequent possible regime change, with the emergence in a weak Russia of a pro-Western (and pro-European) government, which of course (perhaps due to its size and other "factors") would not receive equal status in the European or Euro-Atlantic edifice, would be attractive in itself. So that's probably the reason for the European willingness and not the automatic alignment with the young USA, which as we said, happens (and when it happens) ... selectively. So why wouldn't European countries solve their defense problem (Russia), which would also free them from the need for the US defense umbrella and at the same time, as neighboring economically strong countries, they would also receive a legion share from weak, decaying and decaying Russia? In this strategy the US was the necessary European ally, because of its military/technological strength. Not the strong one they cannot refuse. But more generally, the successful crushing of Russia and its integration into the geo-economic geopolitical Western chariot, for the West in general, along with US control of the Pacific Ocean seems to ensure its global dominance for an indefinite period of time as it forcibly and inevitably limits the rising China. The fact that the possibility of things going wrong was not taken into account is not unique, it has happened in the past and does not invalidate the autonomous European, not conditional, assessment of Ukrainian support. In any case, support for Ukraine is now a greater necessity, since the collapse of state structures in Ukraine, after 28 months of war, would be a major blow to Europe as it would increase the flow of refugees and the need for economic and humanitarian support. As well as less desirable the accidental withdrawal of the US from Ukraine, but also Europe in general.... *Dionysis Pantis, Athens lawyer, geopolitical analyst