My article published in GR DIPLOMATIC CD (Aprils issue) : The strategic challenge of MAVI VATAN (Blue Homeland) for Greece.

The strategic challenge of MAVI VATAN (Blue Homeland) for Greece.

 

The Blue Homeland (MAVI VATAN) of the Islamists Erdogan and the AKP (Justice and

Development Party) is a strategic challenge for Greece.

 

The Turkish MAVI VATAN theorem incorporates all the "classic" 

Turkish disputes thus reaching its limits: that of the Greek 

continental shelf, in a view as a given consequence of the 

blackmail with regard to the casus belli (decision of the 

Great - Turkey is traditionally magnified with Kemal .. or with 

- Mohammed alike - Turkish National Assembly on 8 June 1995) 

of not extending the coastal zone and its extension beyond the 

six miles, although Greece explicitly adheres to this agreement 

and refrains from expanding into the Aegean proving to be a 

peaceful force of responsibility and stability; the "declared" 

search and rescue zone that ostentatiously verbally "claims" 

east of the 25th parallel ("consequence" of the "claim" of the  

continental shelf and lack of EEZ for the islands), the extreme 

aggressive revisionism of the creation of “gray zones” (not only 

in the Aegean; see also Crete – Gavdos island).

But MAVI VATAN, in addition to the "Aegean-centered" challenge 

to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Greece, adds the 

complete challenge to Greek sovereign rights in the Eastern 

Mediterranean (zeroing the EEZ of the Greek islands and 

preventing the right of expansion of the Aegean which 

supposedly unites the Turkish with the Libyan EEZ). 

It attempts to limit the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone 

(EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean to a small part of 

the southwest (!), questioning its ability to communicate 

with the EEZs of all other countries in the region (cutting 

Greece off essentially from the Eastern Mediterranean).

In other words, this is an openly aggressive dogma, an 

expression of extreme maximalism based on the extortion of a

 hot “incident” or an extended war.

In the face of this strategic challenge, Greece - in principle - 

should  be on full and direct vigilance, diplomatic and military 

and conduct continuous analysis and monitoring of Turkish 

movements, in order to deal with and prevent its aggressive 

revisionist plans in a timely manner. It should be noted that, 

after the failed coup of 2016, the last pro-Western networks 

in the country were neutralized, weakening the possibilities of

 any substantial Western influence and substantial deterrence 

of the maximalist anti-Western and anti-Greek Islamo-Turkish 

strategy.

However, the Greek side was content with the assurances of the 

Libyan Foreign Minister that they will not sign a Turkish-Libyan 

EEZ delimitation agreement, despite Saraj's travels to Istanbul 

and the growing expansion of relations at all levels of Turkey 

with the "Provisional Government of the National) of Saraj. 

Furthermore, Greece did not properly assess Turkey's ability to 

change on the grounds of the hasty situation the GNA was facing.

The limitation  of retaliation on the weak side of Libya (removal

 of the Libyan ambassador), the lack of will to have an equivalent

 effect on the strategic challenge of the Turkish-Libyan 

memorandum was a source of wrong messages send.

The message soon received from international actors in the Eastern

 Mediterranean has led to or facilitated or endangered dangerous 

relocations of partners, even those who have the psychological 

preference to work with us (Greece) instead of Turkey.

The hasty agreements with Italy and Egypt, with Greece making 

concessions of fishing rights within the Greek EEZ vis-a -vis 

Italy, reducing its demands for a full EEZ of the islands - even 

in the case of Crete the largest in size of the Greek islands- ,

 the inability to convince the organizing EU partner Germany to 

participate in the Berlin Conference on Libya and the absence of 

the country in Libyas developments (until the recent pro-Turkish 

also formed with complaints-financing new Government), the 

“cruises” of “Oruch Reyes” and “Cesme”  in the Aegean etc., do not

 seem to have provided sufficient treatment.

The lack of understanding or acceptance of the reality of the 

strategic challenge that the Turko-Libyan memorandum constitutes 

for the country (by government and opposition alike) leads to the

 consequent inability to explain to enemies and friends, in its

 true dimensions, the importance of the Turko-Libyan Memorandum

 wich applies the MAVI VATAN Turkish dogma in the Eastern 

Mediterranean), an essential element of a successful diplomatic

 strategy.

It is also necessary to explain to our allies the structural 

anti-Westernism of the Islamic regime in Turkey. A reminder that 

Turkish Islamism is a stream of thought that answers the question

 of how Turkey can reverse its relationship of dependence and 

domination on the West is required.

The Turkish Islamic plan politically facilitated the process of 

democratization of Turkey by introducing multi-party system in 

the country and financially by the clever exploitation of 

neoliberalism to connect the (Islamic) capital of the East 

(Anatoli) with the international financial system and thus, 

obtain the necessary funds to grow.

The irony of the matter is that both developments (political and 

economic) that made possible the predominance of Turkish Islam 

were promoted or rather, applauded by the West!

Dionisis Pantis,

Lawyer at the Supreme Court,