Europe in Old and Repressed Geopolitical Patterns. Is Europe’s Anti-Russian Obsession Anachronistic??

Europe in Old and Repressed Geopolitical Patterns. Is Europe’s Anti-Russian Obsession Anachronistic? Europe (the European Union and the United Kingdom – EU + UK) is rallying – or at least trying to – revising its stance and declaring that it is preparing for a hot or Cold War-style confrontation with Russia. And why not, perhaps even with China.

Recently, the European elites, who remain to a large extent supporters of the globalized liberal order, suffered a double shock: First, the military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army shattered the dream of the post–Cold War dominance of the EU + UK powers in Europe – always under the American protective umbrella. Russia and Ukraine never became the European (Western) El Dorado they had anticipated. The “useful,” yet supposedly manageable, American factor was expected to leave sufficient vital space for the “experienced” Europeans with their long imperial tradition – primarily the Germans, French, and English, but also the Scandinavians, Spaniards, Belgians, Dutch, Portuguese, and the rest of their imitators. Second, Donald Trump’s election to the presidency of the United States revealed, in the most cynical and harsh manner –perhaps not the most humiliating, though the future may hold worse– the true distribution of power within the Western bloc. The United States is the absolute master. The prosperity of the “weaker second,” namely Europe, depends entirely on the will of the bloc’s sole superpower, the first among the world’s three superpowers. Europe is compelled to pay dearly for every “concession” made by Trump.

American favor is a one-way street for Europe. The United States can stand without Europe; Europe cannot without the United States. Europe’s defense and economy depend entirely on American support.

At the same time, the prospect of Russia’s subjugation or even disintegration has failed. The privileged plundering of Russia’s vast resources would have solved many of aging Europe’s problems after two world wars and a cold one. What a blessing a victory over Russia would have been for the West! China, cut off from Russian resources and from other global resources controlled by the West (Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the rest of Asia), would have been forced to capitulate under Western terms.

The image of the leaders of “Old Europe” (Rumsfeld), with the addition of Italy—favored in Washington—posing as if provincial officials in the “New Rome” (Trump’s Washington), visually conveys to viewers across the globe the harsh geopolitical and geostrategic reality of Europe. The major powers of the EU—though in reality medium-sized by today’s global standards—did not wish to transform the Union, despite its vast market and economy, into a geopolitical superpower. The UK withdrew. Germany pursued its own vision of a German-centered Europe. France chose an independent foreign policy, developing privileged bilateral relations with the United States, India, Africa, and others. European integration lagged behind, as national interests and, often, thinly veiled racist stereotypes prevailed: the “efficient” North versus the “corrupt” and “lazy” South, the “old” versus the “new” East. We have previously referred to the historical roots of European anti-Russian sentiment: "Long before the United States emerged as a global power, the European powers—England, France, and Austria-Hungary—agreed that their key strategic goal was the isolation of Russia. Thus, they stubbornly denied it control of the Straits of Constantinople (the Dardanelles) and, if possible, the Black Sea as well. And all this happened even before the enormous natural resources of Russia, beyond its grain, had been revealed." Napoleon himself, in the isolation of Saint Helena after Waterloo (1816), confided to Count Las Cases that the greatest adversary of France—greater even than naval England—was Russia. With its vast expanses, where it could retreat and return at will, and its enormous Euro-Asian reserves, Russia represented Europe’s number one problem. (Hence the significance of Poland as an intermediary space). Later, when Russia’s vast energy wealth became known, Hitler and Nazi Germany coveted it. Hitler chose the difficult path of attacking “inferior” Slavic Russia—in order to secure energy and living space—instead of advancing toward the oil fields of Mosul, via friendly Turkey, as German strategists had proposed. Source: https://www.ibnaeu.com/2024/06/13/einai-i-evropi-to-thyma-tis-politikis-ton-ipa-stin-oukrania/ With the end of the Great Geopolitical Game of the 19th century (the Great Game) between Russia and Great Britain, and Russia’s confinement within the vast territories of Central Asia, the country acquired a size and resources that terrified the European powers. Great Britain skillfully exploited this fear, keeping the continental powers that depended on her under control. This was confirmed recently as well, with Britain’s immediate de facto re-entry—enthusiastically—into the ad hoc anti-Russian alliance.

The violent industrialization of Russia under Stalin’s iron policy during the Second World War, as well as the nuclear balance achieved against the United States, elevated the Soviet Union (and today’s Russia) from a major European power to a global superpower. The two World Wars—essentially European wars that became global due to colonial expansion—destroyed Europe’s comparative power and brought to the forefront two rival superpowers: the United States and the USSR. Europe was reconstructed thanks to the interest of American multinationals and the U.S. political elite: as an economic hinterland for the United States and as a bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet Union. The American stamp on Europe was set triumphantly, and the European elites accepted it with relief. Now, under Trump, they reaffirm it once again—though not quite as cheerfully. The Pax Americana after the Second World War, the anti-colonial struggles that granted at least formal independence to the countries of the Third World, and the transformation of Russia/USSR into an industrial power, permanently altered the balance of power in Europe and in the world, to the detriment of the traditional European colonial powers. The last chance for a Unified Europe—defensive and political integration—failed due to national agendas. The Greek crisis and the way it was handled served as a characteristic example of the German-centered logic that excluded the prospect of a truly unified Europe. Europe’s dizziness from the two shocks leaves no room for clear geopolitical analysis. Any deviation from the “official” European line—a common stance of France, Germany, and England—is regarded as treason. Thus, Europe cannot calmly assess the major geopolitical shifts: the enormous imbalance of power between the US and the EU, the shift of American interest toward Asia and especially China, and the preservation of Russia as the third superpower, even if far behind the first two. The European states control no significant trade route, nor do they possess the military power to do so in the foreseeable future. As a result, they are unable to “recall” the traumatic experience of the period before European dominance (1686–1945). A history filled with threats, raids, death, and humiliation—with the last episode being the siege of Vienna (1686) by the Ottomans.

Europe, having lost its global dominance—its hegemony, its undisputed military superiority, its technological leadership, and the economic power it once drew from colonialism and the Industrial Revolution—now risks experiencing a “total return” to its late Roman and medieval history. The possibility, for example, of 150,000 North Korean soldiers fighting in Ukraine on Russia’s side shows how vulnerable Europe would be in such scenarios. Iran, India, North Korea, and of course China—countries that suffered greatly during the 300 years of European dominance—are unlikely to leave unexploited the opportunity to challenge Western hegemony, an opportunity now offered by a pressured Russia. After nearly 1,300 days of war in Ukraine, even a possible collapse of Russia may no longer yield for Europe and the United States the desired outcome: the plundering of its natural resources and the comparative advantage over China. On the contrary, it could lead to the expansion of revisionist Asian powers into Russian or former Soviet territory, closer to Europe. Could it be that Europe’s obsession with balancing Russia in Ukraine ultimately brings greater long-term threats to Europe itself? Could it be that, without Russia containing Asian pressures, Europe will find itself even more exposed? In that case, the militarization of Europe would be permanent and unavoidable, while the European Way of Life—prosperity, rights, environmental protection, labor guarantees—would become definitively a thing of the past. From this perspective, Russia—although pressured between the US and China—constitutes the “necessary evil” for Europe. It is large in relation to the medium-sized European powers, yet small, primarily in demographic terms, compared to the enormous scales of Asia. Russia desperately needs European cooperation in investment and technology in order to maintain its independence between the US and Asia. This leaves vast room for mutually beneficial cooperation—especially for Germany—in a minimally competitive environment. A prospect not at all pleasant for the “ally” United Kingdom. Trump, from the distance of the Atlantic, sees the prospect that the West cannot afford to lose: a rapprochement with Russia. The United States, acknowledging the failure of the globalist elites’ strategy, is preparing for a cooperation that will maintain competition yet allow accommodation with Russia—both for technological reasons and for balancing China. Europe, by contrast, self-destructively insists on an anti-Russian policy that harms it. Its “emotional” reaction to the unpleasant reality makes it incapable of clearly seeing the geopolitical truth. And yet, for itself and its future, it is of vital importance to recognize it: its security is far more threatened as the weakest link of the Western bloc. Dionysis Pantis is a Supreme Court lawyer and geopolitical analyst. **The opinions published on IBNA